Introduction: The map of Islamist movements in the Arab world has changed over the course of the past three decades. There are wide gaps between those movements that use violence, look to change political regimes by force, and seek confrontation with the West, such as al-Qa’ida, and those movements that seek to practice politics peacefully, have respect for the sovereignty of the state, and are willing to work with the reigning political regimes. These latter, moderate groups share a belief in coexistence with the West.
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, American confusion over moderate Islamist groups has caused U.S. policymakers to accuse them of bearing at least some responsibility for the existence of extremist movements in the Middle East. Moreover, because official American discourse conflates moderates and radicals, and sees even moderates as serious threats to U.S. strategic interests in the region, the United States has accepted or ignored Arab regimes’ repression of Islamist movements. The danger is that the exclusion of moderate groups from the political arena may cause them, and their constituents, to radicalize. As Francois Burgat has written, “State violence creates the violence of the Islamists.
The current situation in the Arab world presents the following dilemmas: Can Arab regimes, with the backing of the United States, successfully exclude moderate Islamists from the political scene? What are the risks of doing so? What are the effects of exclusion on the interests and image of the United States in the region? Given these questions, how then should the United States deal with moderate Islamists? This paper analyzes the dangers posed by excluding all moderate Islamists from the political arena, and recommends measures by which the United States can engage moderate Islamist parties in order to advance both its democratic principles and national security interests.
Back to Homepage 
Facebook 
Digg 
Yahoo 
Del.icio.us 
reddit 
StumbleUpon 
Mixx 
Google 
